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Abstract: Deficit irrigation (DI) is an agricultural practice in which the volume of irrigation water
applied during the crop cycle is below the irrigation requirements for maximum production, the aim
of which is to increase irrigation water productivity. Most research on this technique has focused
on agronomic strategies while the economic and environmental consequences have received little
attention. This study aims to shed some light on this matter and presents preliminary results
regarding the implications of DI with respect to the sustainable use of water resources. The analysis
is based on the DPSIR analytical framework (Driving force/Pressure/State/Impact/Response) and
the microeconomics of DI. The case study focuses on intensive olive groves in the Guadalquivir
river basin in Southern Spain (where olive cultivation accounts for 50% of the total irrigated area).
The analysis shows that the widespread use of DI practices, which is the farmers’ response to a
decreasing net water supply and falling farm incomes (driving force) in the context of a mature water
economy, may help to break the DPSIR chain of causality, provided that there are restrictions on any
expansion in irrigated area. They can, thus, play a role in achieving sustainable water use. Conversely,
demand and supply (regulator) responses involving raising the price of water would lead to higher
pressures on the resource and represent a negative driving force in our DPSIR model.
Keywords: sustainability; deficit irrigation; water mature economy; water policy
1. Introduction
To achieve sustainable water management, hydrologic and economic dimensions must be taken
into account as part of an integrated management system. This is especially true in parts of the world
that have long since entered a ‘mature water economy’ phase characterised by a limited water supply
and growing water demand with increasingly conflicting uses [1]. Some regions have even gone
beyond this phase, as indicated by the current ‘closed’ state of their river basins and/or aquifers.
Closure of a water body occurs when all resources have been allocated (and frequently ‘overallocated’)
as a consequence of human activity [2]. Dramatic examples of overallocation can be seen in developed
countries such as the USA—specifically California [3]—and Southern Spain [4].
In Spain, irrigated agriculture occupies about 15% of the total cultivated area, but is responsible
for 60% of the total value of agricultural production; the average production per hectare of irrigated
crops is 6.5 times greater than that of rain-fed agriculture [5]. The specific case of the Guadalquivir river
basin (RB) is representative of Mediterranean agriculture and has undergone an intense transformation
in the last 50 years, characterised by a significant growth of irrigated areas, a progressive change in
the composition of crops and widespread use of deficit irrigation (DI) practices in a context of water
scarcity. Against this backdrop, farmers have had to respond to a continued decline in farm incomes,
which have decreased by 1.1% annually since the early 1990s, due to the increasing cost of inputs
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and lower commodity prices [6]. Public responses to water scarcity (once it is no longer possible to
increase the supply) in the Guadalquivir RB have focused on improving efficiency, supply control
(i.e., irrigation allocation rights and restrictions on irrigated area) and cost-recovery measures.
The result has been an increase in water costs (10% real increase for surface water and 15% in the case
of groundwater, in the period 1997–2008).
The limited water supply in the Guadalquivir RB, along with the abovementioned increases in the
cost of water, have led farmers to use irrigation water more efficiently through the implementation of
DI practices. Such techniques allow farmers to maximise value added per hectare and productivity per
water input, thus offsetting the rising costs and maintaining farmers’ net incomes. Hence, our research
focuses on the technique of DI, defined as providing a volume of irrigation water below the maximum
irrigation needs (for maximum yield) over the course of the crop cycle and allowing mild stress during
growth stages that are less sensitive to moisture deficiency. The expectation is that yield reduction will
be limited, and additional benefits can be gained by redirecting the saved water to irrigate other plots
or for other beneficial uses [7].
Specifically, this paper focuses on the implications of DI in terms of the sustainable management
of the resource, where the use of DI is a response to the decline in farmers’ net income (driving force).
The general context is that of a mature water economy, and we focus on the specific case of olive
cultivation under DI in the Guadalquivir RB in southern Spain (where olive cultivation accounts for 50%
of the total irrigated area). In this regard, public initiatives can be understood as a ‘response’ according
to the DPSIR (which stands for Driving force/Pressure/State/Impact/Response) framework [8],
while the main driving forces are the need to maintain farmers’ net income and the sustanaibility of
rural ecosystems. The latter is important given that the expansion of irrigated agriculture has led to
increased extractions, which in turn has resulted in a deterioration of the environmental status of water
masses (surface-water bodies and aquifers), impacting both the freshwater-dependent ecosystems
and human welfare. The public response to this environmental problem has consisted of supply
constraints (i.e., allocation rights), restrictions on irrigated area (i.e., a moratorium on new areas),
and demand-control policies (i.e., water pricing). On the other hand, in this context of water scarcity
and limited supply, the use of DI practices has become the most common private response to farmers’
falling income. Using a DPSIR analytical framework, this paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of
these two types of responses (public and private) in terms of achieving sustainable water management.
Unlike most economic models based on the assumption that there is limited availability of
irrigated land but an unlimited water supply (i.e., supply significantly exceeds crop needs), this study
assumes that water is the limiting factor (a characteristic of a mature water economy). In their model
of DI, Berbel and Mateos [9] expanded the model developed by English [10]. We use this expanded
model to analyse the farmers’ private response, whereby they decide on the appropriate volume
of irrigation water for their crops in the analysed context, and the implications of this decision for
the sustainable use of the resource. In parallel, we also examine the effectiveness of the regulators’
response of increasing water costs (i.e., water pricing) with reference to a DPSIR model, and in the
context of the mature water economy and resource scarcity that characterise the case study area.
Our assumption that water is a limiting factor in the RB is consistent with farmers’ statements on
the matter and is evidenced by the administration’s policies in the hydrological plans. Furthermore,
in areas where farmers adopt DI practices as the predominant private response, the price elasticity
of water demand is also affected, meaning that water pricing becomes ineffective at curtailing water
demand unless a disproportionately high threshold price is reached [11]. Thus, our first research
hypothesis is that the adoption of DI practices limits the effectiveness of the public (regulator) response
aimed at reducing pressures associated with water extractions, thus rebooting the DPSIR chain of
causality. Conversely, our second hypothesis to test is that the widespread use of DI practices tends
to maximise economic returns to water, thus offsetting the increasing cost of water and preventing a
further decline in farmers’ net income (the driving force in our DPSIR model).
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the analytical framework, as well as
the main implications of private and public responses to be tested in subsequent sections. The case
study and results are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, Section 5 provides a further
discussion of the results, and the main conclusions are summarised in Section 6.
2. Analytical Framework
The process whereby water resource development and use come to exceed available resources has
been observed in many parts of the world and has been widely documented in the literature [12–14].
According to Randall [1], a water economy enters a ‘mature phase’ when the following characteristics
occur: (1) inelastic water supply with increasing marginal supply costs (aquifers are already heavily
exploited, the best dam locations have been taken and other rivers are protected); (2) high and growing
demand (with increasing conflicts among water users); (3) an aging infrastructure which requires
expensive renovation; (4) increasing negative externalities; and (5) a rising social cost of subsidising
water use. Randall’s framework for describing the mature phase of a water economy has been applied
to many countries worldwide, including Spain, where a radical Water Law was approved in 1985,
reinforcing the public nature of all water resources and ensuring that they are used according to prior
allocation of water rights. Based on Randall’s model of a mature water economy and in a context of
water scarcity, a DPSIR model is constructed to illustrate the sustainability implications of DI. In this
regard, a sustainable use of water resources can only be achieved if the resulting responses (public or
private) control the driving forces that place pressures on the resource. As discussed in later sections
of this paper, this is the only way to break the damaging chain of causality that is the unsustainable
exploitation of water resources for irrigation in a mature water economy.
2.1. DPSIR Model
The DPSIR framework, an extension of the PSIR framework, is used to understand the appropriate
responses to the impacts of human activities on the environment along a causal chain: driving
force-pressure-state-impact-response [15]. Human activities generate pressures on the environment.
These pressures change the state of the ecological system, which leads to negative impacts on humans.
These negative impacts (should) lead to a societal response. DPSIR analytical models are usually
policy-oriented and provide a framework for analysing a problem domain, where all the variables
that fall into one of the categories (D-P-S-I-R) have to be included. Details depend on the specific
problem domain under consideration, although in the field of integrated environmental assessment
this framework has been applied to a wide range of issues, such as coastal zones, water, transport, and
pollution control, and more recently, to issues pertaining to sustainable development [16,17].
Thus, in order to gain an overall understanding of the impact of a response measure in a system
characterised by interactions between environmental and economic uses, it is appropriate to apply
a DPSIR scheme of analysis, as shown in Figure 1. This analytical scheme helps us to understand
how the increase in water extractions—a ‘pressure’ stemming from the ‘driving force’ of maintaining
farmers’ income through irrigation development (i.e., area expansion and/or intensification)—leads to
changes in the ‘state’ of water bodies, which become ‘impacts’, which in turn are met with ‘responses’.
In this context, the ‘pressure’ leads to a deterioration in the ‘state’ of the water body, in terms of both
quantity and quality, and this generates an ‘impact’ on the environment, as well as on human health.
The main response to these ‘Impacts’ has been an increase in water-use efficiency that has driven
irrigation modernisation. It should be noted, however, that the concept of ‘irrigation modernisation’
refers not only to greater efficiency in the use of irrigation water (i.e., through the use of water-saving
and conservation technologies (WCTs)), but also to a wide range of socio-economic responses, such as
factor productivity maximisation (e.g., widespread use of DI practices, etc.) and public planning and
control initiatives (e.g., volumetric billing and water-pricing policies). As expected, these responses
generate effects on pressures (e.g., minimising extractions), states (e.g., improving water quality and
boosting the quantity available to meet the demands of other users, including the environment) and
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impacts (e.g., reducing agro-contaminant levels in water bodies). However, such responses may lead to
higher costs (e.g., investment and monitoring costs, water price increases, etc.), which have a negative
impact on farmers’ net income. This may then trigger a new driving force in a potential vicious circle,
as shown in our proposed DPSIR framework.
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Public responses such as control of allocation rights and restrictions on irrigated area may have
a positive impact on pressures (i.e., by reducing water extractions). In addition, promoting the
widespread use of DI practices as a private response can be a way of achieving more sustainable use of
water resources. Nevertheless, public responses based on price increases (i.e., water pricing) imply
higher costs for farmers [18], cutting into their net income and accelerating the unsustainable vicious
circle depicted in Figure 1. Conversely, private responses (e.g., DI practices) tend to minimise impacts
on net income by maximising the economic value per unit of water.
2.2. Implications of the Private Response
Traditionally, farmers calculate the irrigation volume on the basis of the level of evapotranspiration
(ET), the effective rainfall, and irrigation efficiency. In turn, irrigation efficiency depends on the
uniformity of application and the relative irrigation supply (RIS). RIS is the ratio between the applied
irrigation water and irrigation requirements [19] (total irrigation demand less effective rainfall).
In the short term, the decision variable that can be managed is the irrigation v lume. In their model
of DI, Berbel and Mateos [9] expanded th model developed by English [10] to account for DI,
by inc uding in the agro-ec nomic model efficiency changes where water rather than land is the
limiting fact r. Following this d velopme t, Expósito and Berbel [20], using estimates obtained from
a sample of olive farmers in Southern Spain whose indiv dual respons s consisted of the extensive
use of DI practices, compared the actual irrigation volume that a farmer appli s to a crop with the
solutions to the optimisation problem. The findings presented in the ext section show that these
irrigation practices represent the farmers’ primary response and a way to optimise water value
(i.e., the productive value per unit of water used), while minimising the effects on farmers’ net income
of future increases in water-related costs, as well as those stemming from further supply restrictions.
As shown in the DPSIR model presented above, if this hypothesis is confirmed, the widespread use of
DI practices could potentially break the chain of causality. A sustainable management of the resource
could thus be achieved in a context where no expansions in irrigated areas are permitted (i.e., where
there is a moratorium on new irrigated areas).
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2.3. Implications of the Public Response
Spanish water policy, which is regulated by the Water Act of 1985 and has been adapted to ensure
compliance with the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000 [21], requires the implementation
of a river basin management plan, which must be updated every six years, according to the WFD
provisions. So far, two river basin management plan cycles have been defined [22]. The main
measures adopted by the government, following a public participation process, include investment
in WCTs, volumetric metering, and water-pricing implementation (cost recovery) and, in particular,
a moratorium on new irrigated areas. All of these measures can be considered ‘public responses’ in the
mature phase of a water economy.
Once all available water resources have been allocated and a moratorium has been declared on
new irrigated areas, water pricing has usually been considered an appropriate public response to
guarantee a sustainable use of the resource. Further, its aim is to ensure the price reflects the economic
and social value of the resource and contributes to efficient allocation of the resource to different
uses [23]. Water pricing has also become the main strategic public tool for water and environmental
policy in developed economies, as noted in the WFD [21] and the Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s
Water Resources [24]. Most of the related water pricing literature focuses on analysing farmers’
responsiveness to pricing pressures. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of literature that concludes
that water pricing is not particularly effective at curtailing water demand. The studies of Bernardo and
Whittlesey [25], Ogg and Gollehon [26], Dinar and Letey [27], and Varela-Ortega et al. [28] are good
examples of attempts to model responsiveness to water pricing among farmers facing restricted water
supply. Moreover, several studies claim that irrigation water demand is inelastic below a threshold
price, and elastic beyond it [29]. Thus, substantial price increases would be required to produce a
reduction in demand, and such increases may have a critical impact on farmers’ net income and
welfare, as well as on the sustainability of rural environments.
In our case study in Southern Spain, as in many parts of the world, farmers do not freely decide
on the amount of water they will use to irrigate their crops, as water access is restricted by water rights
(i.e., irrigation quotas). Under conditions of water scarcity and low water prices, the amount allocated
is likely to be below the amount of water that farmers would be willing to take at the prevailing
price, thus promoting the use of DI practices. This use of irrigation volumes that maximise returns to
water [9,20] would, therefore, also push up the theoretical threshold price, after which point demand
begins to show negative price elasticity [11]. This point is especially significant in our case study,
as public responses that entail increases in water-related costs would only translate into reductions
of farmers’ income, with little or no impact on reducing water demand. Thus, if this hypothesis is
confirmed, and as shown in the proposed DPSIR model, the chain of causality would be rebooted,
leading to an unsustainable management of the resource and an endless vicious circle.
3. Materials
3.1. Case Study
The case study is in the Guadalquivir RB, which is representative of the Mediterranean region,
and contains 23% of the total irrigated area in Spain with more than 850,000 hectares [5] (see Figure 2).
The Guadalquivir is the longest river in Southern Spain (mainly located within the region of Andalusia),
with a length of about 650 km and a basin extension of over 57,527 km2. The basin has a Mediterranean
climate with an average rainfall of 630 mm, occasional periods of prolonged drought, and an average
annual temperature of 16.8 ◦C. Annual renewable resources are estimated at 7.1 × 109 m3 for surface
waters and 2.6 × 109 m3 for groundwater. Olive (both rain-fed and irrigated) is the predominant
crop, accounting for more than 50% of irrigated area in the RB. The use of DI practices is widespread.
Moreover, the introduction of WCTs has also allowed farmers to significantly increase tree densities
(between 250 and 300 trees per hectare), which in turn has enabled them to maximise the economic
value generated per unit of water used and maintain (or even increase) their net income.
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3.2. Survey Description
The field work was conducted in the spring of 2014, using information provided by farmers of
intensive olive groves in the Guadalquivir RB area regarding yield and irrigation volumes per ha for
the period 2010–2013. The analysed sample consists of 48 observations (farmers), which significantly
describe this crop in the RB. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1, revealing following average
values: (a) farm size: 40 ha; (b) density: 283 trees/ha; (c) total allocation of water rights: 2723 m3/ha
(referred to as the legal water quota owned by the farmer); and (d) irrigation doses: 1028 m3/ha.
We observe a discrepancy here, as average water use represents 38% of average water rights
(1028/2723), which we consider an indication of the dominant DI strategy studied in our research.
Potential ET in the year of the survey was estimated at 492 mm for the intensive olives.
Although the variability within the sample (as shown by the estimated standard deviations)
seems high, the table shows that the observed farmers tend to apply a far smaller irrigation volume
than that permitted according to their assigned water rights, generally indicating a preference for
DI techniques.
Table 1. Basic descriptive parameters.
Area
(ha)
Density
(Trees/ha)
Age
(years)
Irrigation Rights
(m3/ha)
Yield
(kg/ha)
Irrigation Vol.
(m3/ha)
Average 40 283 15 2723 6382 1028
St. Dev. 64 80 6 1846 2344 388
Source: The authors, based on survey results.
4. Results
Our study uses n alternative approa h based o the elicitation of a ubjective ‘perceived
production function’ as the microeconomic foundation f a farmer’s decision-mak ng process regarding
water use, rather than the ‘objective’ production function tra itio ally us d in the literature. Using this
individual subject ve water demand function elicited from an indiv dual subjective water-yield curve
in the ‘normal’ agronomic r ge (maximum yield should be within the normal range for the crop and
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region) as defined in Expósito and Berbel [20], the effectiveness of private and public responses defined
in Section 2 will be tested. The answers given by farmers regarding their expectations as to water
consumption (m3/ha) and yield (k/ha) in three possible irrigation scenarios enable the estimation
of the quadratic production function needed to test both responses—private (by farmers) and public
(water price increases implemented by government authorities)—and their implications for water
management sustainability.
4.1. Private Response
This paper aims to test the hypothesis that in the context of a mature water economy (characterised
by water scarcity and growing water costs), the farmers’ response tends to be to maximise returns to
water as the limiting factor in order to maintain their net incomes.
Our study compares actual irrigation volumes applied by farmers with the three optimal solutions
to the profit maximising problem as set out by English [10]. Most water-use models are based on
the assumption that there is limited availability of irrigated land but water supply is unlimited
(i.e., it significantly exceeds crop needs). Accordingly, water is treated as a variable input and land as a
constrained resource. This assumption implies that farmers displaying rational economic behaviour
should maximise the following profit equation:
Z = PyY− PwW − C (1)
where Z denotes profit, Py is the sale price of the crop, Pw is the price of water, and C represents fixed
costs. In their model of deficit irrigation, Berbel and Mateos [9] expanded the model developed by
English [10] to account for deficit irrigation, efficiency changes and the situation in which land is not a
binding constraint and water is a limiting factor. Thus, farmers who behave rationally in an economic
sense seek to maximise total net income:
Z · A = A · (PyY− PwW − C) (2)
In this equation, farmers may distribute the irrigation dose over a larger irrigated area “A”, which
is considered a variable in the maximisation process. The fixed factor here is water volume “V”, which
is constrained so that irrigated area “A” is determined by the total volume of available water “V”
(depending on well capacity, water rights, etc.) and the chosen water dose “W”.
A =
V
W
(3)
Optimal water use is then defined by the value of W that optimises Equation (2), subject to
Equation (3).
− A · ∂Z
∂W
= Z · ∂A
∂W
(4)
Further, quadratic water response production and cost functions, such as those represented below,
are estimated:
Y(w) = a1 + b1W + c1W2 (5)
C(w) = a2 + b2W (6)
The solution to the optimisation problem posed in Equation (2) considers water as a limited input
while land becomes a freely variable input. This alternative model gives the maximum return to water
(dose “Ww”) which is determined by solving Equation (4):
Ww =
(
Pya1 − a2
Pyc1
)1/2
(7)
Sustainability 2017, 9, 1144 8 of 13
Table 2 shows data regarding the following variables: estimated irrigation volume that maximises
returns to water (Ww), usual DI volume applied (Wu, as declared by farmers), average irrigation
effectively applied in the period 2010–2013 (Wo) and irrigation rights allocated to each farmer (2014).
Table 2. Farmers’ irrigation behaviour.
m3/ha
Elicited Values Survey Values
Max. Return to Water (Ww) Irrigation Rights Usual DI (Wu) Avg. Vol. 2010–2013 (Wo)
Maximum 2731 7000 2500 2500
Minimum 248 200 600 600
Median 1013 1750 1450 1042
Average 1163 1,2 2723 1357 1 1103 2
St. Dev. 571 1846 425 350
1 With a 95% confidence interval, the t-test for the difference between means determines that mean Wu = mean Ww;
2. With a 95% confidence interval, the t-test for the difference between means determines that mean Wo = mean Ww.
Source: adapted from Expósito and Berbel [20].
As Table 2 shows, the average irrigation volume is close to the volume which maximises returns
to water when water is the limited resource. A simple t-test of significance between the mean values of
the data distributions for Wo and Wu, and that obtained from the estimated distribution of variable
Ww, shows that data pair Wo and Ww, as well as the pair Wu and Ww, have similar distributions
with statistically equal mean values. This result would seem to indicate that our farmers display
similar behaviour (on average) to that corresponding to the maximisation of the returns to water, thus
confirming our hypothesis about farmers’ private response, as described in Section 2.
Therefore, results obtained from the estimated microeconomic model would seem to confirm that
olive farmers tend to maximise value generated per unit of water in a scenario where water is the
limiting factor, as is the case in a mature water economy. The widespread use of DI practices, which do
not deplete allocated irrigation rights (as shown in Table 2), would then function as a desirable private
response in our DPSIR model. Using such techniques tends to alleviate the growing pressures in
terms of water costs and, thus, minimise the negative impacts on farmers’ income, helping to achieve
sustainable management of the resource. Nevertheless, this response only leads to a sustainable
outcome if the irrigated area remains constant. If the area under DI expands, the pressure on the scarce
resource would increase, leading to non-sustainable results.
4.2. Public Response
As previously discussed, the responses to water scarcity included in the Guadalquivir RB
management plans have principally focused on the following measures: a) restrictions on irrigated
area, b) control and reduction of water rights, and c) water-pricing policies (including volumetric
metering and cost recovery). These measures have been incorporated in both RB plans (2009 and 2015),
with a special emphasis on controlling the allocation of water rights to irrigators and a progressive
implementation of water-pricing initiatives.
As described above, the answers given by farmers regarding their expectations as to water
consumption (m3/ha) and yield (kg/ha) in three possible irrigation scenarios (extreme DI, standard
DI and full irrigation), allow us to estimate Equation (5). Based on this subjective production
function, farmers’ water demand is equal to the marginal product value of water (MPV) defined
by the following equation:
MPV = P′y × dY/dW = P′y × (b1 + 2·c1W) (8)
In the above function, P′y is equal to the ‘net farm gate price’ (i.e., the sale price of olives minus
harvesting costs) and parameters b1 and c1 depend on each farmer and each subjective production
function (subject to b1 > 0; c1 < 0). Thus, a subjective water demand function can be elicited for each
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individual farmer yielding the threshold price at which a farmer’s water demand function becomes
price elastic (as described by Expósito and Berbel [11]).
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the elicited threshold levels (prices) for the estimated
marginal product value of water at the standard irrigation volume applied by each farmer in our
sample. As observed, elicited threshold prices are well above the current water costs borne by the
farmers. Specifically, the average estimated marginal product value associated with the average
volume of irrigation water applied in our sample shows that the threshold price would be around
1.2 EUR/m3. This marginal value of water has been estimated using an average price for olive oil of
2.0 EUR/kg in the period 2010–2013. From 2016, low harvests and high demand have pushed the price
of olive oil up to 4.0 EUR/kg and, thus, the marginal value of water has doubled, although the forecast
is that prices will level out at around 3.0 EUR/kg in the medium term.
The average marginal value of water (using conservative estimates of product prices) is 10 times
the current average water cost paid by our sample of farmers (0.11 EUR/m3). This would indicate
that the price elasticity of water demand is very low (or inelastic), until the threshold level is reached.
As a result, the practical effect of public responses is simply cost increases for farmers and a reduction
in their net income, thus potentially rebooting the pressure on the resource (as shown by the DPSIR
model in Section 2).
Table 3. Elicited threshold price vs. water cost.
Elicited Threshold Price
(EUR/m3)
Water Cost
(EUR/m3)
Maximum 4.68 0.30
Minimum 0.20 0.05
Median 1.03 0.08
Average 1.22 0.11
St. Dev. 0.88 0.09
Note: Average is the mean of all elicited individual parameters. Source: adapted from Expósito and Berbel [11].
Though elicited threshold prices are influenced by the existing water management practices in
the RB, a widespread use of DI techniques usually leads to changes in the economic value of water,
characterised by an increase in the marginal product value of water and the threshold price level [11].
Consequently, the marginal product value of water and the threshold price determine the structure of
water demand and evolve independently of water cost (and related public responses). Therefore, in
our irrigated olive case study, public measures resulting in higher water costs would not be expected
to play a key role in determining our farmers’ water demand, unless water price levels increase
disproportionally and rise above the threshold price.
5. Discussion
The farmers’ primary response to decreasing net incomes in a context of water scarcity and
increasing water costs has been to maximise the productivity of water by using DI as a technique to
maximise returns on water. The adoption of such practices has led to changes in private decisions
concerning irrigation volumes and the economic exploitation of irrigation water. This response has
been developed in the context of a mature water economy, with public constraints on the irrigated area
and the allocation of water rights (as specified in the last Guadalquivir RB plans).
Governmental RB plans have also devoted financial resources to promoting ‘irrigation
modernisation’, defined as reducing water losses and increasing water efficiency through automatic
control, volumetric metering, etc. Undoubtedly, these public measures have had significant impacts on
the use of water resources (i.e., surface and ground waters). Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this
study to examine those impacts. A more detailed analysis of the consequences of modernisation at the
farm level can be found in Fernández, García et al. [30], and at a basin level in Berbel et al. [31].
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Regarding the restrictions on irrigated area, a more flexible approach was adopted in the last
plan (approved in 2015) in response to lobbying from farmers during the public participation phase.
As an exception, the latest RB plan allows the use of an additional 20 hm3 (mainly from reused treated
wastewater) in the case of DI olive groves, which are considered a priority crop under this measure,
thus allowing a small increase in irrigated area of around 1.5% (approximately 13,000 new irrigated
hectares on top of the existing 880,000). In our opinion, and based on our analytical framework,
this relaxation of the moratorium jeopardises the sustainability of water resources in the Guadalquivir
RB, as the water in question should be devoted to environmental uses. Conversely, the irrigated-area
control should be carried out through more extensive volumetric control of water abstractions,
especially with regard to groundwater.
Most experts on the matter argue that the strategic public response, in addition to restrictions
on irrigated area and water-pricing measures, should be to store the ‘saved water’ for environmental
purposes and to improve supply reliability instead of expanding irrigation [32]. The public response
in the Guadalquivir RB has for the most part (with the exception of the abovementioned reuse of
wastewater) followed this strategic line. Regarding price measures, they have been based on cost
recovery principles and volumetric pricing, which are commonly understood to be solutions to the
increasing pressures on the resource. However, our analysis concludes that they will be ineffectual
at reducing water abstraction when DI is widespread (as is the predominant situation in our case
study). In fact, only a few marginal areas with very deep aquifers may be affected by an energy cost
increase, but the increase in public water prices (presently around 0.02 Euro per m3) will be mostly
useless. Our conclusion is in line with the analysis of the case in Morocco presented by Molle [33],
who concludes that the marginal value of irrigation water is far higher than its costs to the farmer
and, as is commonly found in many field studies, overly high prices may also push farmers to shift
to groundwater, especially where aquifers are shallow. In fact, a recent worldwide review has found
no evidence from any country in the world that water pricing has ever been successful at reducing
pressures on the resource [34].
Control of water abstraction from surface water is relatively well managed as it generally
depends on public storage and distribution systems. On the contrary, there is insufficient control
of groundwater abstraction, and this issue should be urgently addressed by the RB authority,
as it has been demonstrated that the exclusive use of water pricing (or energy cost) is not enough to
produce sensible behaviour in this regard. The main problem in the RB is groundwater abstraction
and the solution to this, given the difference between marginal water value and water cost, may well
be the implementation of the so-called ‘aquifer contracts’ [35]. Aquifer contracts seek to ensure the
co-management of groundwater between the users and the administration. These contracts are fairly
simple in some respects (the water accounting, for example) but more complex in others (stipulating
actions that ensure the control of irrigation expansion). Again, international experiences provide only
few examples of successful co-management, such as Eastern La Mancha in Spain [36] or Murray in
Australia [36].
Sustainable governance of water resources should involve effective responses to control the
driving forces and address the pressures on the resource, thus ensuring long-term sustainability.
Nevertheless, effective governance remains an important challenge, especially with regard to
groundwater resources [37–39]. In our opinion, this challenge can only be successfully tackled with an
adequate understanding of the attributes of the resource and its socio-economic context, as well as the
explanatory factors for human actions and responses regarding the exploitation of water resources.
Only then can an analysis of the impacts of these actions and responses be carried out. As Ostrom [40]
points out: “If the initial set of rules established by the users, or by a government, are not congruent
with local resource conditions, long-term sustainability may not be achieved. Studies of irrigation
systems . . . suggest that long-term sustainability depends on rules matching the attributes of the
resource system, resource units, and users.” We hope this study has helped in that direction, offering
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a preliminary analysis of the impacts of human decisions (public and private) regarding the use of
irrigation water in a context of a mature water economy.
6. Conclusions
The past twenty years have seen substantial progress in the practical application of DI techniques
for both annual and perennial crops [41]. Most related studies examine the agronomic technicalities
of the optimal DI supply, whereas the economic and environmental consequences have received
little attention. This study has presented preliminary results regarding the implications of DI for the
sustainable use of irrigation water. To do so, it relies on a DPSIR model and the elicitation of optimal
water use and threshold price levels for a sample of olive farmers in Southern Spain.
Findings in our specific case study in the Guadalquivir RB illustrate that the private response
to increasing water costs and a fall in farmers’ net income in the context of a mature water
economy—where the RB authority has implemented measures to further control water use and
declared a moratorium on new irrigated areas—has been the widespread of DI practices. Such practices
involve reducing the volumes of irrigation water applied in order to maximise the monetary value
obtained per unit of water used. As discussed, this response may help break the DPSIR chain of
causality, subject to strict control of irrigated areas, and thus help achieve sustainable water use.
On the other hand, regulators’ responses based on water pricing cannot prevent a rebound effect in
this process, which would lead to higher pressures on the resource by negatively affecting farmers’ net
income (thus reactivating the driving force).
We believe that the extensive adoption of DI practices may have further relevant consequences for
RB management, as well as for the sustainable management of water resources, especially in mature
water economies (or closed river basins), where a decisive role will be played by farmers’ appropriate
responses to the ‘pressures’ and ‘impacts’ identified. Going beyond the scope of this preliminary study,
further research is needed to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the development of these
private responses and their impacts on the sustainable use of the resource at a RB or regional scale.
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